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ABSTRACT
Guy Standing’s new book, A Precariat Charter, does not allow us to forget that we live under the shadow 
of the “precariat” – a group of people who are deprived of any work-related guarantees, subjected to 
uncertain income, and without a collective identity that is rooted in a labour world. Among the many 
merits of his most recent book, Standing reports the damaging effects suffered by a substantial section 
of the European trade union movement. At the root of this decline is labour’s submission to a socially 
irresponsible and environmentally unsustainable model of development. First, I will examine the book 
from a Southern perspective. The data and examples that Standing provide pertain largely to changing 
working-class relations in advanced capitalist countries. In contrast, I will focus my attention on the 
metamorphosis of the working class in the Global South – particularly Brazil – during the post-Fordist 
era in order to raise questions about the class character of the precariat. 
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Introduction
Guy Standing’s most recent book, A Precariat Charter, does not allow us to forget that we live under 
the shadow of the “precariat” – a group of people who are deprived of any work-related guarantees,
subjected to uncertain income, and without a collective identity that is rooted in a labour world
(Standing, 2014). Among the many merits of this book, Standing reports the damaging effects suffered 
by a substantial section of the European trade union movement. At the root of this decline is labour’s
submission to a socially irresponsible and environmentally unsustainable model of development. 
As with Standing’s (2011) previous volume on the precariat, there is much that is praiseworthy 
in A Precariat Charter. But by raising provocative and challenging questions, studies of this magnitude 
also encourage productive debate. In this spirit, I am going to challenge and extend Standing’s 
argument by examining the book from a Southern perspective. The data and examples that Standing 
provides pertain largely to changing working-class relations in advanced capitalist countries. In 
contrast, I will focus my attention on the metamorphosis of the working class in the Global South – 
particularly Brazil – during the post-Fordist era.  
First, Guy Standing supports the idea that the precariat is a new class and that it is changing. We 
could say that the advent of this new class accompanied the process of “Brazilianisation” of advanced 
capitalism, promoted by neo-liberal globalisation. “Brazilianisation” of advanced capitalism refers to: 
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(a) the increasing informalisation of jobs, (b) the decline of unionisation rates in the Global North,
and (c) the retreat of social protection for workers. Therefore, a look at the formation of the post-
Fordist precariat in Brazil may be useful to contextualise the scope and boundaries of Standing’s 
analysis. 
Second, it seems that Standing’s political conclusions about the relationship between the 
precariat and social struggles – that is, the precariat as a “new dangerous class” potentially close to 
authoritarian solutions for the current economic crisis – derive conceptually from the separation 
between the precariat and the working class. In order to interpret the precariat’s political behaviour in 
a way that is more aligned with new developments in, for example, southern Europe (Portugal, Spain 
and Greece) and Latin America (Brazil), this article follows a Marxist agenda according to which the 
precariat is formed mainly by the most exploited and dominated fractions of the working class. 
Although there is a political barrier between the precariat and the trade union movement, erected by 
union bureaucracy, there is no insurmountable contradiction between them. 
Finally, I intend to analyse Standing’s main proposal, intended to inspire the political action of 
the precariat – the universal basic income agenda. Therefore, this article briefly examines the Brazilian 
example of the universal basic income experience – the Bolsa Família programme (BFP) – in order to 
argue that although the universal basic income is attractive to the Brazilian sub-proletariat, the main 
source of political attraction for the Brazilian precariat remains the struggle for their citizenship rights. 
In this sense, the precariat tends to approach the labour movement and not depart from it. 
 
 
From Peripheral Fordism to Global Precariat: The “Brazilianisation” of
Advanced Capitalism?
My main argument here is that the rise of the precariat both in Brazil and Portugal suggests that this 
group is part of the working class and is more likely to find allies among trade union leaderships than 
among the well-intentioned technocrats that Standing refers to in The Precariat Charter. If 
precariousness is becoming the norm, it may well threaten decades of the institutionalisation of social 
rights in advanced capitalist countries. However, the truth is that it was never the rule on the periphery 
of the system. Is this one more sign of the “Brazilianisation” of advanced capitalism? Or is it simply 
a demonstration that capitalist development, beyond being permeable to a plurality of rhythms, is not 
directed by any progressive telos, revealing itself, on the contrary, as combined and unequal?  
The assumption is that the post-Second World War industrialisation process in countries such 
as Portugal and Brazil was characterised by the superation of primitive Taylorism (even though, 
especially in the textile and electronics industries, primitive Taylorism endured as a management 
strategy to control labour). They were thus accumulation regimes supported by low-productivity 
industries and oriented to the export of non-durable consumer goods to other peripheral Fordist 
countries. The notion of peripheral Fordism designates the process of mechanisation associated with 
intensive capital accumulation and the growth of a durable consumer market that, in the Brazilian 
case, began in the 1950s and extended to the early 1990s with the advent of neo-liberalism and the 
integration of the national economy within the process of capitalist globalisation. 
Thus there exists an articulated system of capitalist, pre-capitalist and semi-capitalist social 
relations dominated by the world market. In a nutshell, the global market was structured by a 
combination of developed and underdeveloped capitalist nations in a multilateral, self-conditioning 
system. In this social system, dominated by the globalisation of commercial exchanges, the formation 
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of peripheral Fordism represented one of the principal historical mediations between the advanced 
capitalist and the underdeveloped capitalist countries. 
The “peripheral” character of this social system arose from the fact that the most skilled levels 
of manufacturing, especially in the engineering sectors, remained outside these countries. Moreover, 
from the point of view of durable consumer goods, the economic dynamics were focused on raising 
the purchasing power of the local middle class at the expense of a decline in the consumption capacity 
of workers, resulting in inflation, a rise in labour productivity, wage degradation, workforce turnover, 
and so on. The productivity gains achieved by mechanisation were not passed onto the salaries of 
workers, helping to reinforce the proletarian and semi-proletarian army that was effectively 
underemployed through the restrictions of workers’ needs. 
Finally, the peripheral Fordist development model was supported by an articulation between 
import substitution policies and a shift in the content of exports towards durable consumer goods 
coupled with a resumption of imports of capital goods from the central countries. Thus, during the 
post-Second World War period, peripheral Fordism became the predominant development model in 
these countries. It is important to note that the transition from international Fordism to globalised 
post-Fordism reproduced these asymmetries. Surprisingly, Guy Standing did not deal with these 
structural features in his analysis of the emergence of the global precariat.  
Actually, as Jan Breman notes, it is unlikely that Standing is unaware of the condition of the 
precariat in the Global South given his background:  
 
An economist at the International Labour Organization from 1975 until 2006, Guy Standing 
should be well placed to address these questions. Though his recent work has focused largely 
on the condition of labour in the Western world, he is well acquainted with the precarious nature 
of work and life for most people in the global South; he has been a presence at international 
seminars and conferences discussing the vulnerability of workers in the informal economy for 
many decades. His first publication with the ILO was a scholarly treatise on labour-force 
participation in low-income countries in 1978, followed by labour-force studies on Jamaica, 
Guyana, Malaysia, Thailand and elsewhere. In the mid-80s, Standing was responsible for a series 
of ILO analyses of labour-market ‘flexibility’ in the OECD countries, which took a sceptical 
view of neoliberal nostrums while accepting that the capitalist economies had entered a new era, 
marked by unemployment and fiscal crises. In the early 90s he switched to Russia, editing In 
Search of Flexibility: The New Soviet Labour Market (1991) for the ILO, followed by post-Apartheid 
South Africa with Restructuring the Labour Market: The South African Challenge (1996) (Breman, 
2013: 131). 
 
The class character of the precariat also has to be addressed. Standing (2014) reaffirms that the 
precariat is not a part of the working class, a label which he reserves for unionised workers in stable 
employment. In my opinion, this definition is closer to the concept of “salariat” created by economists 
from the French Regulatory School, which describes a social norm of consumption found in the 
Fordist model of development. According to Standing, the precariat constitutes a class “in 
transformation”, a by-product of capitalist globalisation and its concomitant strategies to make 
working conditions more flexible. However, from the point of view of Brazil and Portugal, we should 
not forget that precariousness has always been a constitutive part of the working-class condition.  
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The Precariat as “Precarious Proletariat”: Following a Marxist Agenda
It is important to note that this article discusses the precariat according to Marxist terms. Standing 
shares the sociological understanding that precariousness is a condition located outside the wage 
relationship. In other words, if it were not for neo-liberalism and the current global economic crisis, 
the institutionalisation of citizenship rights through the wage relation would certainly replace 
precariousness through social protection. I argue to the contrary – that, due to the commodification 
of labour, the capitalist character of the division of labour and the anarchy of the reproduction of 
capital, precariousness is actually constituent of the wage relation. Consequently, the precariat should 
not be defined as the antipode of wage labour, as a repressed “bastard”. In fact, the Fordist 
compromise showed itself quite adept at protecting the professional, white, male, adult, national and 
unionised fractions of the working class at the expense of the unskilled or semiskilled, female, black, 
young and immigrant working class.  
Standing (2014) identifies the particularity of Fordist citizenship with the totality of the wage 
relation. Thus, the insecurity of employment and the permanent threat of socio-economic exclusion 
that marks the reality of a growing number of young people entering the labour market appear to him 
as a ghost straight out of the nineteenth century. It is worthwhile remembering here that at the height 
of the Victorian era, long before Fordism took its first steps, Marx (2013: Chapter 25) had exorcised 
this spirit by associating the increased number of industrial occupations with the formation of a 
surplus population. Thus, he argued that it was capitalist accumulation itself that despotically produced 
– in the form of unemployment or precarious work – a surplus working population necessary to the 
capitalist mode of production and clumped around four distinct, but mutually permeable, fractions. 
Given the dynamics of capitalist investment and the acceleration of the consumption of labour power, 
the floating population comprised those workers who were sometimes attracted to and sometimes 
repelled by companies. The latent population consisted of non-industrial workers and youth waiting 
for an opportunity to leave traditional sectors, especially the rural areas, in order to establish 
themselves in industry. The stagnant population, in turn, constituted a part of the workforce occupying 
decrepit and poorly paid jobs, resulting in their living conditions falling to substandard levels of 
existence. Finally, the pauperised population comprised the mass of impoverished, indigent, sick and 
injured workers, as well as those too old to work. In addition to the description of each of these types, 
what stands out in Marx’s analysis is his ability to relate the progress of labour productivity made by 
industry to the deterioration of the living conditions of the urban proletariat and rural workers.  
In my view, the precariat – that is, the precarious proletariat – consists of what Marx called the 
“relative surplus population”.1 This definition seems to be more precise than that advanced by 
Standing. First, it allows us to locate the precariat in the heart of the capitalist mode of production and not as 
                  
1 This excluded both the lumpenproletariat and the impoverished portion of the population. Marx described the 
lumpenproletariat as “the refuse of all classes”. Formed “alongside ruined and adventurous offshoots of the bourgeoisie, 
[they] were vagabonds, discharged soldiers, discharged jailbirds, escaped galley slaves, swindlers, mountebanks, 
lazzaroni, pickpockets, tricksters, gamblers, maquereaux [pimps], brothel keepers, porters, literati, organ grinders, rag-
pickers, knife grinders, tinkers, beggars…” (Marx, 2011. Through this category, Marx aimed to draw attention to the 
deepening social degradation, especially prominent in times of crisis, that a large number of individuals were submitted to, 
separating them from their originating class and turning them into a “disintegrated mass” vulnerable to reactionary 
movements. On the relation between the lumpenproletariat and the emergence of Nazi Fascism in Germany, see Trotsky 
(1979). However, it is worth remembering that neither Marx nor Trotsky explored conceptually the relation between the 
pauperised population and the lumpenproletariat. 
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a by-product of the crisis of Fordist development. Second, it emphasises the historical and relational 
dimension of this group as part of the working class and not as an intergenerational and multiclass 
amalgam that would progressively emerge as a new class.2 Third, instead of arbitrarily removing the 
insecurity of the wage relation, this notion enables us to treat precariousness as an intrinsic dimension of
the process of the commodification of labour. To support my interpretation of the precariat and the concept 
of relative surplus population, I follow the suggestion of Paul M. Sweezy:  
 
In this connection let me call attention to Chapter 17 [of the classic study by Harry Braverman],
‘The Structure of the Working Class and Its Reserve Armies’, where the thesis is put forward 
that Marx’s ‘General Law of Capitalist Accumulation’, according to which the advance of 
capitalism is characterized by the amassing of wealth at one pole and of deprivation and misery 
at the other, far from being the egregious fallacy which bourgeois social science has long held it 
to be, has in fact turned out to be one of the best founded of all Marx’s insights into the capitalist 
system. How much more coherent and useful the voluminous literature of recent years on 
poverty and related questions would be if it had started from this solid foundation! (Sweezy, 
1998: xxvii).  
 
Moreover, we must analytically distinguish pauperism (and the lumpenproletariat) from the precariat, 
because precarious workers are a part of the working class in constant transit between the possibility 
of socio-economic exclusion and the deepening of economic exploitation:  
 
…the higher the productivity of labour, the greater is the pressure of the workers on the means 
of employment, the more precarious therefore becomes the condition for their existence, 
namely the sale of their own labour-power for the increase of alien wealth, or in other words 
the self-valorization of capital (Marx, 1992: 798). 
In falling into pauperism, these workers fail to fulfil any relevant function in relation to the economic 
exploitation of class, conforming themselves to what Marx called “the hospital of the active labour-
army and the dead weight of the industrial reserve army” (Marx, 1992: 797). 
The need to define the general limits of the precariat also requires us to differentiate it from the 
professional sectors – that is, more qualified, well-paid and therefore more stable workers. In short, I 
identify the precariat with the poorly paid and exploited urban proletariat and farm workers (excluding 
the pauperised population and lumpenproletariat), since they are central to the reproduction of 
peripheral capitalism. Under this perspective, the present deepening of job insecurity on a global scale
is not a surprise: it is supported by the increase in the exploitation of the workforce, and above all by 
the plundering of social rights. It is a regression in terms of civilisation, enhanced by a long period of 
deceleration in capital accumulation since the 1970s. How should we interpret this regression, which 
leads us to a new relationship between the youth and the trade unions? 
                  
2 Because they have few skills, do not exercise authority and do not contract labour, precarious workers are the most 
subordinate and exploited fraction of the working class. 
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The Precariat and Trade Unions
To a certain extent Standing’s analysis hits the nail on the head, particularly when it comes to new 
arrivals to the labour market such as interns and telemarketing operators. As he suggests, these young 
workers are dealing with frustrated occupational ambitions, which cannot compare to the occupational 
stability often enjoyed by their parents. But if Standing accurately captures the insecurity of these 
young workers, his characterisation of their relationship to trade unions deserves to be problematised. 
For him, young workers in precarious employment are hostile to trade unions due to both their lack 
of political experience and the precariousness of their labour, which together make it practically 
impossible to organise at the workplace. This supposition leads him to underestimate the precariat’s
self-organisation capacity, and to overshadow the capacity for trade unions to adapt to new realities at 
work. 
In A Precariat Charter, Standing suggests that the precariat will only be well-represented through 
agencies of social and economic governance. By attempting to “inspire action” in the precariat through 
an “alternative political agenda to a utilitarian democracy”, Standing (2014) directs the politics of the 
precariat towards the reform of public policies. After all, if the trade unions are condemned to 
disappearance, as Standing believes, evidently they are unable to propose solutions that would 
strengthen the universalisation of social rights and confront the precaritisation of labour. But what 
would happen if precaritised young workers viewed trade unions more positively – not as representing 
the unobtainable privileges of previous generations, but rather as potentially making it possible to 
access the social rights denied to their parents? In other words, what would happen if the precariat is 
seen as part of the working class and not a new class with opposing interests to the unions? 
The complement to Standing’s under-estimation of formal trade unionists is his tendency to 
project onto the precariat a set of “objective” interests and then to assume that policy initiatives that 
conform to these interests would ignite the loyalties of the precariat towards bureaucratic policy 
instead of encouraging a closer approach to unionism. In this sense, a curious incident took place 
when, in 2004, I first started my field research on São Paulo’s telemarketing operators. Similar to 
Standing, I had doubts about the trade union consciousness of these young workers. As the research 
evolved, however, I realised that my expectations of workers in the telemarketing sector did not match 
the reality. To a certain degree, my perception changed with the metamorphosis of the Brazilian Call 
Centre industry itself – mergers and acquisitions of companies followed by stringent target rules, 
routinisation of work, managerial despotism, high levels of personnel turnover and low wages. All of 
these conditions fed into workers’ critical attitude to the companies (Antunes and Braga, 2010). This 
critical orientation provided a basis for bringing together the precariat and the trade unions. Despite 
their political inexperience, the telemarketing operators turned to unions for support with respect to 
their labour claims.  
 
Brazil: the experience of Sintratel 
Trade unions in Brazil have done a remarkable job of transforming themselves in order to reach out 
to groups of precaritised workers. How do unions develop strategies to organise such workers and 
build solidarity for collective action? One of the three biggest unions organising telemarketing 
operators in São Paulo city, Sindicato dos Trabalhadores em Telemarketing (Sintratel) developed 
organically from telemarketing workers who sought to challenge the conditions of labour beyond the 
issue of wages. In 2009, for example, Sintratel and the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual and 
transgender (LGBT) community were involved in a labour dispute on behalf of a transsexual 
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telemarketer by the name of “Luna”. Luna demanded the right to use the female restroom rather than 
the male restroom. However, the call centre where Luna worked insisted that she use the male 
restroom because the company still considered Luna a man. Sintratel was victorious in representing 
Luna in the judicial proceeding against the call centre, winning Luna the right to use the female 
restroom.  
This labour dispute reached beyond working conditions for the individual employee to address 
broader issues of human rights and homophobia in the workplace throughout the city of São Paulo. 
Hence, Sintratel’s success as a labour union is based on a highly effective social movement unionism 
model that works in collaboration with other social movements to build a sense of solidarity among 
the union, workers and diverse racial, ethnic and gay communities throughout metropolitan São Paulo.  
Building solidarity with the community and other social movements deals directly with three 
very delicate issues in Brazil that are typically avoided by traditional labour unions, but which are 
fundamental to the development of Sintratel – unequal treatment of women, racial discrimination 
against blacks, and homophobia. Sintratel sponsors active engagements with contentious social issues 
because of their impact on the everyday lived experiences of their rank-and-file members. For 
example, Sintratel actively sponsors and participates in events celebrating International Women’s Day, 
the Gay Pride Parade in São Paulo every June, and the Black Consciousness March on November 20, 
which was declared a municipal holiday in remembrance of the black resistance leader, Zumbi dos 
Palmares.3 Sintratel directors are activists in a number of social movements, which combines their 
labour organising experiences with broader social issues. There is no break between the subjects of 
the community and the labour union; instead there is a continuous ebb and flow between the union, 
its workers and marginalised communities.  
The success of these effort can be measured by the recent increase in strikes and work stoppages 
among telemarketing operators in São Paulo (Braga, 2012). In 2012 alone, a nationally backed strike 
brought 280 000 workers to a standstill for ten days. A considerable percentage of the strikers were 
telemarketing operators. Another example is the recent and successful rapprochement between São 
Paulo’s metro transport union and the “Free Pass Movement” (Movimento Passe Livre). 
 
Portugal: collaboration between unions and social movements
An examination of the Portuguese case raises similar questions about the supposed political 
incompatibility between the precariat and the trade union movement, identified by Standing. Due to 
increasing unemployment, combined with the declining significance of trade unions in collective hiring 
contracts, Portuguese trade unions have been suffering a certain level of erosion at the base. The 
unionisation rate has been in decline (Rajado, 2013; Stoleroff, 2013). However, while both the number 
of workers on strike and the average number of working days lost declined between 2002 and 2007, 
between 2010 and 1012 the opposite occurred (Pordata, 2014).  
How have precaritised young Portuguese workers reacted to the blatant increase in 
unemployment and underemployment, and to the traditional union movement response to the 
deepening of the economic crisis?  
It is clear that the “Generation at Risk Movement” (Geração à Rasca) inaugurated the new cycle. 
                  
3 Many companies in São Paulo refuse to recognise Black Consciousness Day as a municipal holiday, so Sintratel sponsors 
debates on that day with activists from the black movement União de Negros pela Igualdade (UNEGRO), to discuss the 
contemporary situation of black woman, black youth, and the effect of neo-liberalism on black people. 
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The story is well known, but it is worth remembering: Inspired by the song Parva que Sou (“I’m Silly”)
by the rock-fado group Deolinda, Alexandre Carvalho, António Frazão, João Labrincha and Paula Gil 
decided to organise an event on Facebook; their manifesto called on unemployed youth, casual 
workers, interns and working students to protest in Lisbon to demand better working conditions. The 
demonstration took place on 12 March 2011. The event was extremely successful, with about 300 000 
demonstrators in Lisbon and 80 000 in Porto. Following this first experience, movements connected 
to precarious labour – such as the Inflexible Precarious Workers’ Association, Hired and Unemployed 
Professors, and The Comunidária Association (a non-profit organisation that promotes gender 
equality and equal opportunities for people at risk of social exclusion) – organised a powerful social 
protest: “To Hell with the Troika!” The two main protests took place on 15 September 2012 and 2 
March 2013, with each bringing together over one million people in the main cities of the country. As 
the protest movement became increasingly politicised it also sought to enlarge its support base, 
predominantly by working towards a rapprochement with the trade union movement. 
A mere two weeks after the first protest took place, the Central Union CGTP called for a protest 
supported by the organisers of the “To Hell with the Troika!” movement; this took place on 29 
September 2012 at Terreiro do Paço in Lisbon. In a speech by CGTP President Arménio Carlos, who 
had been present on 15 September, he called for industrial action on 14 November 2012. Not only 
has the popular mobilisation process that took place in Portugal between 15 September and 14 
November 2012 unveiled a new political conjuncture, but it has also demonstrated the feasibility of a 
collaborative approach between the trade unions and the movements connected to precarious labour 
(Estanque, Costa and Soeiro (2013). 
Even bearing in mind the relative social demobilisation in Portugal after the huge success of the 
“To Hell with the Troika!” movement, a certain collaborative stance has evolved between unions and 
workers in precarious employment, albeit slowly. Some of the successful approaches include: the 
creation of the Sindicato Nacional de Call Centers (National Union of Call Centres); the 
transformation of an association of cultural workers in precarious jobs into a union, the Union of 
Musicians, and Performing Arts and Audio-visual Professionals (CENA); and the recent victory of 
the Associação Precários Inflexíveis (Inflexible Precarious Workers Association), in collaboration with 
the nurses’ union affiliated to CGTP, in gaining recognition as employees – rather than being 
misrepresented as independent contractors – for roughly 400 nurses who work as telephone operators 
of Linha Saúde 24 [Health 24 Line]. 
 
Comparing Brazil and Portugal
There are a number of differences between the Brazilian and the Portuguese cases. Young workers in 
Brazil, for example, fought to implement social rights, while in Portugal they mobilised to retain their 
rights while defending the Social State. In both cases, however, there is little evidence of hostility 
towards the democratic regime, let alone towards the trade union movement. In fact, in both cases 
the precariat recognised trade unions as potential allies in the fight for the expansion and defence of 
the Social State. Likewise, the trade union movement identified the precariat as an indispensable force 
in strengthening their claims. From the point of view of Brazil and Portugal, there does not appear to 
be an insurmountable contradiction between union interests and the needs of the precaritised youth. 
In reality, in both countries, the future of democratic struggles resides precisely in the convergence of 
these two sectors. 
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The Brazilian Precariat: Universal Basic Income or Citizenship Rights?
Finally, I would like to present a short critical consideration of Standing’s main proposal for 
transforming the “denizens” of the precariat into full “citizens”. This is the proposal for a Universal 
Basic Income: a sum of money that is paid unconditionally to every citizen belonging to a certain 
region. In his new book, particularly in the chapter entitled “Move Towards a Universal Basic 
Income”, Standing (2014) reiterates the need to replace the union agenda with a new agenda of 
economic security and social mobility, supported by a broad reform of public policies which would 
culminate in the Universal Basic Income. 
I should make it clear from the outset that I am not at all against the implementation of policies 
which ensure unconditional income. In fact, my argument goes in the direction of affirming that this 
kind of agenda, at least in the Brazilian case, does not fully meet the demands raised by the precariat 
in the wave of protests that have taken place since June 2013. After all, putting pressure on the 
authorities in favour of the Universal Basic Income seems to be a political role reserved to the precariat 
by Standing. Therefore, the question of knowing the extent to which this political solution is in the 
interest of the precariat becomes decisive. 
Since 8 February 2004, Brazil agreed through the Bolsa Família programme to universalise basic 
income policies, starting with the impoverished portion of the population. Many Brazilian scholars 
have provided data to show that the BFP is largely efficient in helping families to escape extreme 
poverty (Bichir, 2010; Pochmann, 2012; Pinzani, 2014). In the last decade the BFP helped to reduce 
income inequality, considerably changing the consumption patterns of poor families. The BFP was 
also primarily responsible for decreasing the rate of extreme poverty in the country, which dropped 
from 8 per cent of the Brazilian population in 2001 to only 4.7 per cent in 2011. Between 2003 and 
2013, annual federal spending on the BFP jumped from 7.5 billion to 24.7 billion reais, focusing on 
16 million families living in extreme poverty. The benefit reaches almost 60 million citizens (Pinzani, 
2014).  
Consistent with Standing’s proposal, Brazilian law stipulates that the BFP benefit should 
eventually be extended to all Brazilian families, regardless of their level of income. In order to disburse 
70.00 reais monthly to every Brazilian family would require 82 billion reais per year. Based on figures 
from 2012, this would force the government to increase welfare spending from the current 3.15 per 
cent of the budget to around 10.5 per cent. 
This is a remarkable increase in social spending. Given that other expenditure in security, health, 
education, and transfers to states and municipalities are defined constitutionally, the government 
would be obliged to reduce spending on public debt, which currently consumes 43.98 per cent of the 
federal budget. Needless to say, this would trigger a fierce redistributive struggle between social classes 
within Brazilian society. 
If the agenda of economic security and social mobility supported by the Universal Basic Income 
implies engaging society in a struggle against the financial system, why would the Brazilian precariat 
mobilise around a very modest amount of 70.00 reais per family, rather than an agenda focused on 
raising spending on health, education and urban mobility? Besides, it was precisely around these 
demands that millions of young workers with precarious employment took to the streets in June and 
July last year (Antunes and Braga, 2013; Braga, 2014). 
There is no longer a great controversy about BFP’s effectiveness in getting millions of sub-
proletarians out of “absolute poverty”, and raising them to the official status of “poverty”. But the 
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same cannot be said about the next step – that is, to guarantee them minimum conditions of social 
and occupational progress. Some scholars have argued that the Brazilian government should increase 
social spending at the expense of investments in health and education. This is because the BFP will
not take the assisted families out of their official condition of poverty on its own. Doing so would 
require a combination of economic growth and increased spending on education and health. 
We need not revive here the broad debate taking place in Brazil between those who defend 
universal policies and those who defend targeted policies. In terms of public policy, it seems 
reasonable to argue for an approach that prioritises targeting within a universalist scheme, in a strategy 
of “targeting universalism”. This entails the articulation of two strategies for reducing inequality, with 
the BFP focusing on reducing extreme poverty and universal policies focusing on reducing official 
poverty (Bicher, 2010). 
The Brazilian experience confirms that the BFP does help the part of the sub-proletariat that is 
victimised by extreme poverty. However, the same cannot be said about the young urban workers in 
precarious jobs, who are subjected to terrible working conditions, intermittent employment and the 
harsh reality of low salaries. For these workers, universal spending on health, education and urban 
mobility are a large priority, as they consolidate rights and strengthen the articulation between rising 
qualifications and increasing social protection. 
Standing passes too quickly over the question of whether the European precariat really wants 
to embrace the Universal Basic Income as a flag of mobilisation, rather than preserving the social 
rights to which their parents had access. This assumption obscures a more encompassing view of the 
forms of political representivity associated with the precariat’s interests, specifically in relation to the 




In short, Standing (2014) believes that, in the current conditions of capitalist globalisation and the 
weakening of unions and traditional social democratic parties, the precariat could only be well 
represented through the governance of social and economic agencies. For this purpose, he argues that 
the spheres of formulation of public policies should be democratised through the presence of 
representatives from the “new class”. Of course, I am not arguing against democratisation of the state 
apparatus. However, if we consider the recent Brazilian experience, it is clear that there is no truly 
credible reason for the precariat to defend the Universal Basic Income as its priority flag of 
mobilisation. In fact, this is one of the main lessons of the so-called June Days (Jornadas de Junho), 
which showed that self-mobilisation in defence of citizenship rights continues to define the horizon 
of the political intervention of young workers with precarious jobs in the country. 
By trying to “inspire action” in the precariat through a “political agenda alternative to utilitarian 
democracy”, Standing (2014) has decided to confine the political praxis of the precariat to the field of 
reform of public policies. Clearly, putting pressure on authorities towards initiatives more in tune with 
their interests seems necessary for the political education of the precariat. However, if we wish to 
understand the concrete diversity of its contemporary forms of self-organisation, limiting the 
collective action of this group to such pressure seems somewhat insufficient. 
However, I do not mean by this that the precariat’s relationship with the union movement is 
simple and quiet in Brazil or in Portugal. In both cases, there are many conflicting and divergent issues 
which lead this relationship to a complex level of negotiations. To some extent the bureaucratisation 
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of the trade unions alienates the precariat from the labour movement. In addition, the precariat is 
attracted by the focused public policies that have been implemented in both countries in order to 
mitigate the effects of the neo-liberal reforms on the labour market since the 1990s. However, the 
intention of this brief article was just to suggest that there is no contradiction between the precariat 
and trade unionism. At least, there is not an insurmountable conflict between them in Brazil and 
Portugal. On the contrary, a more collaborative path is being forged slowly but surely between the 
unions and the precariat in both countries, at least since 2008. And this way has the potential of being 
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